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Gillette: Kelo and the Local Political Process

KELO AND THE LOCAL POLITICAL PROCESS
Clayton P. Gillette*
Most of the commentary on the recent decision in Kelo v. City of
New London,' in which the Supreme Court upheld a municipality's right
to condemn private land for economic development, has focused on the
substantive rights allocated by the case. The determination that the
concept of "public use" sufficient to support the exercise of eminent
domain was not limited to facilities accessible to the public as a whole
seems, for some, a significant deviation from the original function of the
Takings Clause.2 Originalism aside, much of the reaction to the decision
evinced hostility to the notion that local governments should ever
condemn privately owned property and convey it to private developers
in the name of economic development. For others, however, the decision
was simply the natural extension of prior decisions allocating to
legislative bodies the capacity to determine the appropriate scope of the
condemnation power.
In this Idea, I want to consider a less-developed perspective on
Kelo, one that treats eminent domain in general, and that case in
particular, as issues of political process. My concern is less with what
local governments can do than with how they can do it. That is not
because I think that the issue of whether government can properly
intervene in the local economy, or the effect of such intervention on
private property owners is unimportant. To the contrary, I consider that
relationship to be crucial to the role of cities as engines of regional
economies. Indeed, one would have a difficult time rejecting the
majority's conclusion that economic development constitutes a

* Vice Dean & Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, New York University School
of Law.
1. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
2. This position was the focal point of Justice Thomas's dissent. See id. at 2677-87 (Thomas,

J., dissenting).
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"traditional and long accepted
function of government," including
3
government.
decentralized
As a consequence, my comments on the case implicitly accept that
the substantive result of Kelo is neither surprising nor novel. Localities
have been intervening in local economies since the Founding, if not by
direct condemnation of property, then by the granting of monopolies, the
donation of what was previously public property to private owners, and
the use of tax monies to subsidize internal improvements considered
appropriate to arm the locality with an advantage in the continuing battle
of interjurisdictional competition.
The direct taking of private property for similar purposes may be
more than simply a variation on these themes, but the historical
relationships between local governments and local economies, combined
with an understanding of the constraints that local governments face
under the decision, may suggest that the list of horribles that have been
predicted since Kelo are less likely to materialize. The intervention of
local government to disturb market allocations of property has not led to
the demise of private property as a concept or to the systematic abuse of
the governmental prerogative, although occasional abuses can
undoubtedly be documented.4 The reason to permit the limited
incursions into private property does not necessarily lie in the good faith
of local officials or the altruism of local business not to offend fellow
citizens. Rather, I want to suggest that the reason to believe that Kelo
will have minimal impact on the allocation of substantive rights of
property owners lies in political safeguards that a careful reading of the
case itself reveals. Armed with those safeguards, Kelo actually
reinforces the historic and traditionally peaceful relationship between
government and the economy. I will suggest at the end of this Idea,
however, that there remain mechanisms that could be employed to
diminish some of the residual abuse.
Let me begin by stepping back from the particulars of Kelo for a
moment and thinking about the problem of eminent domain generally.
The eminent domain power is necessary to cure what is itself a political
3. Id. at 2665. For evidence of government intervention into markets to generate economic
development at early stages of the nation's history, see, for example, OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY
FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774-1861 (Rev. ed. 1969); HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY
AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-

1870(1983).
4. For allegations of abuse in the exercise of eminent domain for economic development, see
Dean Starkman, Cities Use Eminent Domain to Clear Lots for Big-Box Stores, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8,

2004, at B 1.
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problem-the capacity of individual private property holders to frustrate
majority will by refusing to sell privately held land for public purposes.
In theory, publicly interested officials will use the condemnation power
only to solve what is called the "land assembly" problem and only to do
so where the result is to confer net benefits on their constituents, that is,
only to make residents as a whole better off, even though some of those
residents will lose private property that they might have preferred to
retain.
Of course, the grant of such power raises the risk that local officials
will exploit it and will condemn private property even where insufficient
public benefits result. The underlying assumption of constitutional
doctrine that permits takings only for a public use and then only with
governmental payment of just compensation is that these twin
requirements will deter officials from exercising their condemnation
power where public costs would exceed public benefits. But given the
vagaries of both those requirements, the doctrinal safeguards may simply
reflect a calculation that systemic abuse will create a political backlash,
so that fear of electoral redress is the most compelling constraint on local
officials.
Naturally, this happy story of a well-working majoritarian system
has several difficulties. First, majorities may threaten as well as be
threatened with the power of condemnation. Majorities that might gain
marginally from the exercise of eminent domain may gang up on a small
number of landowners who, by virtue of their number, have insufficient
political power to oppose the taking of their property. A coalition that
has a small number of members, however, may not be at a disadvantage
in this context. Small numbers may mean minority status, but might also
mean that those few who bear the entire social cost of creating a public
good share an intensity of interest that justifies their entry into the
political fray. The political problem with issues such as taxation is that a
small amount is taken from many, so that even when taxes are spent on a
project that fails to generate net social benefits, no one has an incentive
to incur the costs of opposing the proposal. But eminent domain means
taking a lot from a few, so those few have significant incentives to raise
their voices loudly.
Second, the assumption that the compensation requirement is an
effective check on abuse of the eminent domain power is itself fraught
with difficulties. Officials must pay compensation, but not out of their
own pockets. They make payments from the public treasury. As long as
officials can tax more, or as long as the benefits to them of a particular
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condemnation proposal outweigh their personal costs, not the public
costs, they have little personal incentive not to proceed.5
Third, the assumption that eminent domain addresses a majoritarian
need, especially in the area of economic development, may be somewhat
heroic. A new big-box store may or may not return economic benefits to
a locality. If it does, the per capita effect on any resident is unlikely to be
sufficient to generate substantial enthusiasm among residents. If the
project is unlikely to generate net revenues for the municipality, the
downside consequences for any given resident are also unlikely to
generate much adverse reaction. But the big-box store owner, which
expects to benefit from siting within the locality, will care a lot, enough
to attempt to invest heavily in lobbying local officials to approve the
condemnation. I do not mean corruption or undue influence is at play.
But when the big-box store promises a cash-strapped municipality-a
status for which all municipalities qualify-untold riches for
accommodating a siting proposal, it is difficult for political officials to
ignore the entreaty simply because a few residents will be required to
surrender their private abodes. A distinct fear that underlies the use of
eminent domain for economic development, therefore, is not simply the
risk that the majority will gang up on a minority, but the risk that a
distinct but powerful political minority can exploit a less powerful one,
while the majority stands apathetically on the sidelines.
The use of eminent domain, therefore, is essentially one of
balancing the public needs of a particular community with the capacity
of public officials to exercise their condemnation power for less public
purposes. How, then, does Kelo affect this political balance? The claim I
want to make is that, the uproar and backlash that the decision has
generated notwithstanding, Kelo is a very conservative opinion that fits
neatly within the tradition of counteracting the need for flexibility in
urban planning with political process protections.
Let me defend this heretical position by recasting the majority's
decision. The majority found that the public use requirement could be
satisfied where a taking for economic development "would be executed
pursuant to a 'carefully considered' development plan.",6 Moreover, the
Court adopted a broad interpretation of "public use," reflecting
deference to legislative judgments about the proper use of public
expenditures and the proper interaction between government and

5. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 347-48 (2000).
6. 125S.Ct.at2661.
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business. Thus, the Court rejected any monolithic metric for economic
development such as a "blight" requirement, at least as a federal
constitutional issue. 7 Instead, at least where the locality was proceeding
pursuant to a "carefully considered" development plan, the Court was of
the view that the judiciary should defer to the judgment that emerged
from those legislative deliberations. At the same time, the Court did find
it necessary to note that nothing in the Kelo case indicated that the City's
development plan was adopted "to benefit a particular class of
identifiable individuals." 8
I want to suggest that the Court's language is heavy with negative
predicates. I do not read the majority decision as a grant of blanket
permission to local governments to use eminent domain for economic
development whenever officials so desire. The opinion does not, for
instance, necessarily authorize the actions such as those alleged to have
occurred in St. Louis, where a national department store responded to a
landlord's demand for a rent increase by having the city condemn the
property and turn it over to the store itself.9
Why do I say that? Because so much of the language of the
decision implies that, given the process utilized in Kelo, the Court could
not identify any apparent political process failure that courts could detect
and correct better than the political process itself. None of the indicia of
either majority ganging up or minority ganging up that underlie our
concerns about the exercise of eminent domain appeared to exist.
But that interpretation does not deny the propriety of judicial
intervention in all circumstances. It only establishes the need to
articulate those conditions under which judicial intervention is
warranted. Look at the language that the majority employs over and
again to justify its deference to local decision making: "The takings
before us ... would be executed pursuant to a 'carefully considered'
economic plan"; 10 "[t]he disposition of this case ... turns on the
question [of] whether the City's development plan serves a 'public
purpose'";1' "[t]he City has carefully formulated an economic
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable benefits to the
community";12 "[g]iven the comprehensive character of the plan, the

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 2664-66.
Id. at2661-62.
See Starkman, supranote 4, at B I.
125 S. Ct. at 2661.
Id. at 2263.
Id. at2665.
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thorough deliberation that preceded its adoption,"' 3 the entire plan will
be judged for its satisfaction of the public purpose requirement.
Now, why does the Court systematically emphasize the presence of
what it variously refers to as a "plan," or a "comprehensive plan," or a
"carefully considered development plan"? I want to suggest that there is
an analogy here to comprehensive versus spot zoning and that the
underlying rationale for the distinction is similar. The existence of a
comprehensive plan, as opposed to land use planning that affects a single
or small number of parcels has two implications. First, it entails a
process that involves significant engagement by multiple actors in public
hearings concerning what should be constructed where and by whom.
One would anticipate that any such process will attract competing
views-not only between property owners and developers, but also
among developers, contractors, and planners. As a result, the capacity of
a small rent-seeking group to impose its will on a complacent majority
or an under-represented minority is diminished.
Second, the presence of a plan implies that multiple current
landowners are at risk. Comprehensiveness and planning entail
simultaneous consideration of multiple parcels. The importance of that
characteristic is derived from the political concerns about eminent
domain that I expressed at the outset. If eminent domain creates a risk of
ganging up on a discrete minority of landowners who, by virtue of their
small numbers, have little political power, then those concerns should
diminish as the number of landowners increases. There is little need for
the affected landowners to reach anything close to a majority to have
effective political voice. Recall that most residents will either be
indifferent to the proposed comprehensive plan or, more likely, will be
insufficiently affected by it to warrant the personal costs of becoming
involved either to support or oppose it. But those directly affected, those
whose personal landholdings are at risk, have sufficient incentive to
become involved that even moderate numbers of them can swamp the
political process by which a final determination is made.
Thus, the implicit conditions established by the Court for judicial
abstention ensure both a forum in which opposition to a proposed
condemnation can be articulated-the hearings process that is implicated
in the promulgation of a comprehensive plan-and an environment in
which those who do oppose the plan have sufficient political weight that
their voices can effectively be heard. This, of course, does not ensure
victory for the vocal minority. It does not prohibit local officials from
13.

Id.
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ignoring their loudly and intensely expressed opposition. But unless we
believe, counter-intuitively, that economic development is intrinsically
or systematically inconsistent with the interests of the majority, it is not
clear why a decision that considered but rejected minority views reflects
anything other than an inevitable outcome of democratic processes.
Those democratic processes are not static in their result, and not
unidirectional. The historical relationship between local government and
business that I acknowledged at the outset has shifted significantly over
America's 230-year history. At times, governmental grants and subsidies
have been common and well-accepted, whether by New York City
granting land lots to private entrepreneurs who promised to develop
them at the turn of the 1 8 th century, 14 or the use of tax-exempt bonds to
subsidize the borrowing costs of retail chains.' 5 At other times, any
dedication of municipal resources to private endeavors has been
considered anathema, whether by the refusal of the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts to use state funds to rebuild private housing
structures after the Great Boston Fire of 1872,16 or the initial invalidation
by state courts, particularly in the South and Northwest, of the proposed
use of even revenue bonds to finance industrial plants.17
But this very flexibility in defining the proper relationship between
local government and the local economy is what makes the inquiry
uniquely unsuitable for judicial investigation. Courts are pretty good at
applying principles of law that have staying power over time. Where the
principle is one of political will, however, courts do best by deferring to
the political institutions that can best gauge the political sentiment of the
time-assuming, of course, that the political bodies can be trusted to
interpret and apply that sentiment properly.
That, I want to suggest, is what the majority in Kelo was intimating.
I do not read the Court as concluding that the political process will
inevitably work itself pure, that local officials will never fail to favor
politically powerful developers over individual residents, even when
they collectively lobby for their position, especially when those residents
are likely-post-taking-to move to other jurisdictions and thus be less
able to exact electoral redress from those same local officials. Indeed,
even comprehensive plans, as Justice O'Connor's dissent suggested, can
14. See HARTOG, supra note 3.
15. Bd. of Dirs. of the Indus. Dev. Bd. of New Orleans, Louisiana, Inc. v. All Taxpayers,
Property Owners, Citizens of New Orleans, 848 So. 2d 740 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
16. Lowell v. City of Boston, Il1 Mass. 454 (1873).
17. See, e.g., South Carolina ex rel. McLeod v. Riley, 278 S.E.2d 612 (S.C. 1981); Vill. of
Moyie Springs, Idaho v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 353 P.2d 767 (Idaho 1960).
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18
be designed and implemented in a manner that is ridden with abuse.
My claim is only that the capacity of the judiciary to make inquiries into
the process, to reverse engineer the political decision to determine
whether it was tainted or whether the same decision would have been
reached on objective grounds, is minimal. Thus, perhaps the best that a
court can do is to define the conditions under which the probability of
abuse is minimal and defer to the political process when those criteria
are satisfied.
The negative implication of all this is that no similar presumption
of procedural propriety can be entertained when eminent domain is
exercised against a single or a small number of parcels and then
transferred to a particular private party. Just as spot zoning raises
concerns that the person who got the exception had the fix in, in ways
that are less probable when a locality adopts a comprehensive zoning
plan, so too are the conditions for deference relaxed where the takings
decision implicates so few parcels that one reasonably fears a heightened
risk of abuse. Indeed, Justice Stevens invited just such an exception
when he wrote "a one-to-one transfer of property, executed outside the
confines of an integrated development plan, is not presented in this
case." 19 Hanging over those words is the unspoken parenthetical: "And
when it is presented, I will vote against it."
If what we are ultimately attempting to do, however, is reduce the
probability of abuse by establishing procedural requirements that we
think coincide with its absence, then we might reasonably ask whether
we can do even more than the Kelo opinion demands. Some of the state
legislation that has been proposed and enacted post-Kelo adds
procedural safeguards, such as hearing requirements, to the
condemnation process.2 ° If I am right that openness and opportunity for
collective action will generate more publicly-interested decisions, then
that is all to the good. But I want to suggest that there is an alternative
mechanism that I think would similarly improve, though not perfect the
takings process.
The litigation to date has focused on that part of the process that
permits condemnation only when the result will be public use. I want to
conclude by invoking a suggestion of some commentators, most notably

18.
19.
20.

125 S.Ct. at 2671.
Id.at2667.
For a summary of legislation that has been enacted by states in the wake of Kelo, see

Memorandum from Larry Morandi, Group Dir., Env't, Energy & Transp., Nat'l Conference of State
Legislatures to State Legislators Interested in Eminent Domain Issues (Nov. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/EmindomainMemo.htm.
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Professor Thomas Merrill, 2 that the next wave of litigation on this issue
should involve the question of just compensation. But I say this not in
order to reduce the unhappiness of the condemnees or to help overcome
the holdout problem that requires a collective land assembly mechanism
in the first instance. Rather, I say this because I believe that revisiting
just compensation may further reduce abuses in the use of eminent
domain for economic development.
Recall that one of the concerns expressed in Kelo was the
speculative nature of the public benefits that would materialize if New
London implemented its plan. Many of the condemned parcels had not
been leased, and in some cases even the future use of the parcels
remained unsettled. But there is little reason for local officials not to
forecast the financially rosiest of futures for those parcels, since doing so
gains political support for the project, allowing them to take credit for
what is described as the impending economic boom. Of course, those
officials may be far removed from their local office when those
expectations turn out to be exaggerated. And those claims add nothing to
the cost of the project, since the general rule currently is that those
displaced by eminent domain receive compensation based on the value
of their property prior to creation of the new project.
The incentive for undue optimism, my fancy term for governmental
speculation at the expense of property owners, diminishes if
compensation is evaluated in a manner that incorporates the publiclyexpressed expected benefits of the project. Assume, for the moment, that
we were to modify the meaning of just compensation in economic
development cases to reflect not just the current value of the condemned
land, but also some percentage of the proposed project's expected
benefits to the municipality. This would have the effect of requiring
local officials to pay more for the land, which should restrict their
willingness to make highly speculative uses of eminent domain.
Assume, for instance, that officials justified their use of eminent
domain for economic development by claiming that the locality would
realize $10 million worth of benefits over the next ten years. If the
locality were required to pay current landowners a small percentage of
the current expected value of those benefits, officials presumably would
be less willing to inflate expected values, since any expected values
21.

See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61

(1986); The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and other Private Property: Hearing

Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (Sept. 20, 2005) (statement of Thomas A.
Merrill, Charles Keller Beekman Professor of Law, Columbia University), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.cfm?id=1612&wit-id=4661.
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would generate additional payments. Of course, this would not be a
complete constraint on local officials. As I indicated earlier, local
officials are spending the public's money, not their own, so spending
more of the public's money may be less troublesome to them then we
might hope. On the other hand, officials can only spend the same tax
dollar once, and if we require them to spend more on eminent domain,
they may have to forgo some alternative pet project. Thus, a requirement
that just compensation include some sharing of the upside risk of a
project with condemnees may reduce undue optimism and thus induce a
more meaningful comparison of the costs and benefits of a proposed
economic development.
So Kelo may not be the harbinger of doom, the end of private
property rights, or the grasp of an omnipotent state apparatus. It may
simply be a recitation of the conditions under which courts refrain from
interfering with political decisions. Those conditions do not perfectly
reflect a distinction between the abusive and desirable exercise of the
awesome power of eminent domain. But the courts could have done
worse. They could, for instance, have made that determination a matter
for judicial appraisal on a regular basis. At least the Court knew enough
to know the limits of its own competence.
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